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Resumen
Este ensayo plantea la problemática derivada 
de no contar con un sistema penal que busque 
sancionar a los funcionarios o agentes de la 
Organización de las Naciones Unidas que 
abusen de su posición o influencia, para 
obtener privilegios o cualquier tipo de ventaja 
social, política o económica.
Los funcionarios de dicha organización cuen-
tan con una vía libre a la impunidad debido 
a la falta de un sistema penal mundial que 
los juzgue por los crímenes cometidos en 
ejercicio de su cargo. 
Ejemplos de esto son (i) la violación masiva 
de mujeres en el Congo por parte de los 
Cascos Azules, o (ii) los negocios de los 
cuales se lucraron numerosos funcionarios de 
la entidad en desarrollo de acuerdos ilegales 
con el gobierno de Irak, relacionados con 
el acuerdo de Petróleo por Comida pactado 
con dicho país. 
Finalmente, se argumenta a favor de la nece-
sidad de crear un nuevo sistema penal para 
los funcionarios o agentes de las Naciones 
Unidas, y se sugieren algunas ideas prelimin-
ares sobre cómo alcanzar dicha meta.
Abstract – Master´s Thesis
This work introduces the problems derived 
from the inexistence of  a criminal law system 
aimed	at	punishing	the	officials	and	agents	of 	
the United Nations Organization, that abuse 
their	position	or	influence,	in	order	to	obtain	
privileges or any type of  social, political or 
economic advantage. 
The	officials	of 	said	organization	have	a	green	
light to impunity, due to the lack of  a global 
criminal law system that may judge them for 
crimes committed during the term of  exercise 
of  their position. 
Examples of  this are (i) the massive sex-
ual abuse of  women in Congo by UN 
Peacekeepers, or (ii) the deals with the Iraqi 
government related to the Oil for Food 
Program, through which several officials 
enriched themselves.
Finally, the paper argues in favor of  the 
creation of  a new criminal law system for 
officials	or	agents	of 	the	United	Nations,	and	
It suggest some preliminary ideas of  how to 
reach that goal.
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Introduction
The expanding role and growing importance 
of  the United Nations poses the need of  
creating norms, mechanisms and institutions, 
designed to hold UN officials criminally 
accountable for committing or aiding and 
abetting white collar crimes.
The current system of  diplomatic immuni-
ties,	added	to	the	difficulty,	and	many	times,	
impossibility, for domestic courts, to try UN 
officials,	for	that	type	of 	crimes	constitutes	an	
unjustified	status quo that fosters and tolerates 
corrupt practices within the UN system.
The victims of  UN corruption are the con-
stituents of  a global public sphere, namely 
(i) global citizens and UN member states, on 
the one hand, and (ii) the citizens and states 
deemed	 to	 benefit	 from	UN	activities	 and	
funding.
The preservation of  that status quo severely 
undermines the credibility and legitimacy 
of  the UN. In many cases it jeopardizes the 
possibility of  achieving peace and security in 
areas of  intervention. Also, it puts at risk the 
feasibility of  successfully achieving the goals 
pursued by myriad of  UN activities.
This problem is even greater, if  we consider 
that the most egregious corruption episodes 
involving	UN	officials	 have	 taken	 place	 in	
countries and regions with huge humanitarian 
catastrophes, such as Iraq, Kosovo, Darfur, 
and Rwanda.
Below	I	aim	to	show,	in	the	first	place,	the	
seriousness and extension of  the problem 
of 	white	collar	 criminality	by	UN	officials,	
and will argue for the need of  criminal ac-
countability as a means to combat and punish 
corruption. 
Second, I will argue that the main victims 
of  these abuses are the abovementioned 
constituents.
Third, I will assert that preserving the current 
status quo is a mistake, and that reform pro-
posals aimed at fostering criminal account-
ability by member states under traditional 
jurisdictional norms does not contribute to 
solve the problem. 
Fourth, I will try to make the case for the 
need of  counting with criminal accountability 
institutions at the international level with the 
capacity and competence to hold accountable 
UN	officials	involved	in	corruption	scandals.	
I also elaborate on some of  the crimes that I 
believe should be punished.
Lastly, I will mention some ideas of  institu-
tional design that might be useful as a means 
to achieve the construction of  a system of  
criminal	accountability	of 	UN	officials.
1. The Problem
1.1 General Remarks
Corruption is generally viewed as one of  the 
most common and serious crimes by citizens 
worldwide and by state governments.1 In 2004 
the World Bank estimated that more than 
$1 trillion –the equivalent to 3% of  gross 
world product– is paid in bribes every year.2 
Corruption	has	been	defined	by	 the	World	
Bank	as	the	abuse	of 	public	office	for	private	
gain.3	 In	 furtherance	 of 	 the	 fight	 against	
corruption, Transparency International pre-
pares annual reports whereby respondents 
give their view on the levels of  corruption 
in nation-states around the globe.4 Only 
recently, however, a real concern with regard 
to the grave impact of  corruption within 
the context of  the United Nations (UN) has 
started to grow. 
An extremely naïve perception that prevailed 
during	years	assumed	that	UN	officials	were	
1 See Conclusions of  the meeting of  the G8 Foreign 
Ministers’ Meeting. Miyazaki, Japan, 13 July, 2000. 
“We therefore call for the adoption of  the United 
Nations Transnational Organized Crime Convention 
and Related Protocols by the end of  this year. 
Corruption also undermines democratic institutions 
and accountability, economic development and 
international	cooperation.	We	call	for	the	ratification	
and effective implementation of  the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention”.
2 Bhargava, Vinay. Curing the Cancer of  Corruption. 
In: Global Issues for Global Citizens. Chapter 18, 
341-370, 343.
3 Id. at 341.
4 2009 Global Corruption Barometer, Transparency 
International. 2. www.transparency.org 
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immune to the temptation of  corruption. That 
perception has been progressively dismantled 
during the past two decades. Egregious cases, 
such as the oil-for-food program, just to men-
tion one, triggered a strong alarm about this 
type of  corruption. However, the measures 
undertaken by the UN in reaction to those 
cases seem insufficient, when compared 
to the gravity of  the conducts and to the 
extent of  the problem. It is my contention 
that criminal accountability is needed in that 
type of  cases.
UN	officials’	corruption	is	particularly	serious	
given (a) the importance of  the mission of  the 
UN to achieve peace, international security 
and human development, (b) the universal 
trust that states and global-citizens deposit on 
it, (c) the huge impact that its action has over 
countries with harsh conditions of  violence 
or social backslash, and (d) the direct effect 
that it has as a combustible of  domestic 
corruption, whereby the revenues of  corrup-
tion are thereafter monopolized by corrupt 
government	officials,	their	family	members	or	
cronies, or brokers and middlemen.5
The General Assembly, aware of  the need 
of  preventing and fighting corruption at 
all levels, in the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document, resolved to:
“24.	(c)	To	make	the	fight	against	corruption	
a priority at all levels and welcome all actions 
taken in this regard at the national and 
international levels, including the adoption 
of  policies that emphasize accountability, 
transparent public sector management and 
corporate responsibility and accountability, 
including efforts to return assets transfe-
rred through corruption, consistent with 
the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption. We urge all States that have not 
done so to consider signing, ratifying and 
implementing the Convention;”6
The	Convention	 itself,	 however,	 is	 insuffi-
cient to address the need of  punishment of  
UN	officials	 involved	 in	 conducts	 typically	
considered to be criminal in modern states. 
5 Bhargava, Vinay. Supra, 343.
6 A/60/L.1. September 15, 2005. World Summit 
Outcome. P.7.
At most, the UN imposes a duty on states to 
fight	against	corruption	and	adjudicate	cor-
ruption cases, but that doesn’t seem to be a 
feasible solution.
The	 lack	of 	 teeth	of 	 the	UN	 to	fight	cor-
ruption within its own personnel is a major 
problem. As it also occurs with UN peace-
keepers accused of  sexual exploitation and 
harassment7, the UN lacks of  legal authority 
to prosecute wrongdoers in corruption cases. 
The best it can do is impose administrative 
or disciplinary sanctions, and repatriate the 
wrongdoers to the countries of  origin, with 
the hope that they will be prosecuted by a 
local court, which is almost never the case.8
Below I will exemplify the gravity of  the 
problem by providing an oversight to the 
General	Reports	of 	 the	Office	of 	 Internal	
Oversight Services of  the UN, and by pre-
senting a general picture of  corruption of  
UN	officials	in	the	context	of 	the	interven-
tion in Iraq.9 Other cases left unaddressed 
here, among many others, are misconduct 
of 	UN	official	in	Kosovo,	South	Lebanon10, 
7 Schaeffer, Brett. Critical Reforms Required for U.N. 
Peacekeeping. September 8, 2009. P. 1. http://www.
heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/Critical-
Reforms-Required-for-UN-Peacekeeping 
8 Murphy, Ray (2006) ‘An Assessment of  UN Efforts 
to Address Sexual Misconduct by Peacekeeping 
Personnel’, International Peacekeeping, 13: 531-546, 
532.
9 Generalized misconduct also occurred in the UN 
intervention	in	Congo.	The	UN	Office	of 	Internal	
Oversight Services (OIOS) played a vital role in 
the investigation for accusations of  misconduct 
against	UN	officials.	 Its	 report	 centered	 on	 an	
extended behavior of  sexual crimes committed by 
UN peacekeepers and civilians, in detriment of  the 
persons they were deemed to protect. In May 2005 
it was reported that 152 peacekeeping personnel 
and 5 UN staff  members had been summarily 
dismissed. Despite those actions, a widespread 
perception prevails in the sense that peacekeeping 
personnel crimes remains in impunity (…) It is 
very important that such conducts are not left 
criminally unaddressed, particularly as they are 
unintended, yet almost inevitable, consequences of  
UN peacekeeping operations. This is also the case 
for	 corruption	 involving	UN	officials.	Bhargava,	
Vinay. Id. at 352.
10 Murphy, Ray (2006). Supra, 543. (Asserting that 
in September 2005 the UN announced “it would 
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Somalia and Darfur, where the contingents 
also had a role in corrupt practices.
In this section I will not elaborate on the 
specific	mode	of 	 the	 corruption-related-crimes 
committed	by	UN	officials.	For	now,	it	should	
be enough to say that those crimes involved 
activities defined by criminal legislations 
around the globe as (i) abuse of  color of  
office	(traffic	of 	influences	or	undue	abuse	
of 	official	position),	 (ii)	money	 laundering,	
(iii) illicit enrichment, (iv) bribery, (v) scheme 
to defraud, and even (vi) insider trading, by 
extra-neus agents. 
In section V I elaborate further on some 
specific crimes	 for	which	I	 think	UN	officials	
should be held accountable. I also elaborate 
there on some important distinctions that 
must	be	made	with	regard	to	(a)	the	specific	
role	displayed	by	UN	officials	in	the	crimes	
which they allegedly commit, and (b) the mens 
rea element with which they ought to act with 
regard to the specific crimes above mentioned, 
all of  which shall be taken into account in 
determining their criminal liability and the 
gravity of  their conduct. 
1.2 General Reports of  the Office  
of  Internal Oversight Services
The	Office	of 	 Internal	Oversight	 Services	
(OIOS) of  the UN and the defunct UN 
Procurement Task Force unmasked some 
of  the most egregious cases of  fraud, mis-
management,	and	corruption	by	UN	officials.	
An OIOS audit concluded that in 2005 of  
$1 billion in Department of  Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) procurement contracts 
approximately “$265 million was subject to 
waste, fraud, or abuse”.11 
In 2007, after reviewing a large number of  
contracts adding up to $1.4 billion dollars, a 
different OIOS report concluded that at least 
40% of  them were tainted by corruption.12
replace the Ukraine contingent part of  the UN 
force	in	South	Lebanon	due	to	‘significant	financial	
misconduct’.) 
11 Schaeffer, Brett. Supra, 4.
12 Schaeffer, Brett. Supra, 4.
After several inquiries and similar investiga-
tions, in 2008 the head of  OIOS, Inga-Britt 
Ahlenius said:
“We can say that we found mismanagement 
and fraud and corruption to an extent we 
didn’t really expect.”13
In 2009, the annual Report of  OIOS por-
trayed the case of  a fraudulent scheme aimed 
at misappropriating UN fund originally al-
located for a humanitarian project.
“The former OIOS Procurement Task 
Force (PTF-R009/08) substantiated claims 
that a staff  member participated in a scheme 
to defraud the United Nations and embezzle 
funds of  the United Nations Development 
Fund for Women. The funds had been 
allocated for a humanitarian project aimed 
at assisting the people of  Iraq. The evidence 
showed that the fraudulent scheme was 
achieved by steering $350,000 allocated 
for the project to a preferred vendor and 
subsequently assigning a substantial part of  
this amount to the personal use of  the staff  
member. The matter is pending outcome of  
the internal disciplinary process.”14
That same year the Report emphasized the 
need of  acting steady fast in the recovery of  
almost $15,000,000 of  over costs that had 
been paid to two contractors as of  2005. 
As late as 2009 those funds had not been 
recovered. 
“6. In its review of  the supply of  rations to the 
United Nations Transitional Administration 
in East Timor/United Nations Mission of  
Support in East Timor (AP2005/682/06, 
issued in November 2005), OIOS recom-
mended that the Procurement Division, 
in	 conjunction	with	 the	Office	 of 	 Legal	
Affairs, take action to recover $7.9 mi-
llion2 in excess payments to a contractor. 
Subsequently, as part of  its comprehensive 
management review of  procurement by the 
Department of  Peacekeeping Operations 
(AP2005/600/20, issued in January 2006), 
OIOS recommended that the Department 
address accountability for the $7.3 million 
overpayment for transportation costs. (…)
13 Schaeffer, Brett. Supra, 5.
14 OIOS, A/64/326(Part I) (24 Aug 2009) http://
www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/annual_
reports.html 
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Delays in addressing the issue may result in 
further losses.”15
Further, in the General Report of  OIOS of  
2010, the following conclusion was made:
“56. In UNOCI, OIOS investigated a 
report of  fraudulent claims for reimburse-
ment of  travel expenses by various United 
Nations	 officials.	 It	was	 further	 reported	
that	 the	 budget	 allotted	 to	 official	 travel	
had	been	overspent	 for	 the	previous	five	
years (…) The Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions 
expressed concern about the high level of  
travel	expenditure.	OIOS	found	deficiencies	
in the reimbursement process for the travel 
allotment resulting in over expenditures for 
years 2004 to 2007. For example, the initial 
budget	allocation	for	fiscal	year	2006/07	was	
set at $256,000; however, the total expendi-
ture amounted to $2,033,000.”16
Aside from the importance of  having auditing 
mechanisms that aid to control the budget 
and	expenditures	of 	UN	officials	or	missions,	
and of  imposing disciplinary sanctions for 
mismanagement, it is apparent from the con-
clusions of  OIOS’ Reports that something 
beyond bad management have taken place 
in several occasions. For example, spending 
$2,033,000 when the allocated funds for that 
expenditure were $256,000, seems criminal on 
its face. An over cost of  $1,777,000 is simply 
too much, considering that the resources 
spent were almost eight times the resources 
allocated.
Even though OIOS audits did not necessarily 
picture criminal behavior but also pictured 
poor and/or negligent management, an 
important number of  reported anomalies 
involved fraudulent, deceptive or abusive 
conducts, worthy of  criminal punishment.
Iraq
The Iraq oil-for-food scandal is probably the best 
well known scandal of  corruption implicating 
15 OIOS, A/64/326(Part I)/Add.1 (26 Aug 2009) 
http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/annual_
reports.html 
16 OIOS, A/64/326(Part II) (23 Feb 2010) http://
www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/annual_reports.
html 
UN	officials.	Vinay	Barghava	summarizes	the	
facts of  the oil-for-food scandal as follows:
“In 1996, Iraq agreed to the UN-Supervised 
Oil-for-Food Programme, which allowed 
the Iraqi government to sell oil as long as it 
used the revenue to buy humanitarian goods 
for its citizens. When the program ended 
following the U.S.-led invation in 2003, over 
$64 billion worth oil had been sold, of  which 
$39 billion had been used to purchase food. 
However, reports started surfacing that the 
Iraqi government had been imposing sur-
charges on the oil and collecting kickbacks 
from companies supplying the humanitarian 
goods. A U.N. investigation in 2005 found 
that $.1.8 billion in illicit payments had been 
diverted from the program and that much 
of 	the	purchased	food	was	unfit	for	human	
consumption. More that 2,200 companies 
were	involves	(figure	18.2).	Illicit	kickbacks	
came from companies and individuals from 
66 different countries, and illicit surcharges 
were paid by companies from around 40 
countries.”17
Further, an Independent Inquiry Committee, 
headed by Paul Volcker, former chairman of  
the Federal Reserve Bank of  the United States, 
prepared a report on the abuses committed 
during the implementation of  the oil-for-food 
program.18 The Committee was created by 
initiative of  UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan. It was endorsed afterwards by the 
UN Security Council by means of  Resolution 
1538, 2004.19 The Committee counted with 
17 Bhargava, Vinay. Supra, 343.
18 h t t p : / / w w w. b r i t a n n i c a . c o m / b p s /
add i t i ona l con t en t/18/23307545/THE-
ACCUSATIONS-AGAINST-THE-OIL-FOR-
FOOD-PROGRAM-THE-VOLCKER-REPORTS 
May 11, 2010. 
19 SC/1538, 2004. “The Security Council, Expressing 
the desire to see a full and fair investigation 
of  efforts by the former Government of  Iraq, 
including through bribery, kickbacks, surcharges on 
oil sales, and illicit payments in regard to purchases 
of  humanitarian goods, to evade the provisions 
of  resolution 661 (1990) of  6 August 1990 and 
subsequent relevant resolutions, Concerned 
by public news reports and commentaries that 
have called into question the administration and 
management of  the Oil-for-food Programme 
(hereinafter the Programme) established pursuant 
to resolution 986 (1995) of  14 April 1995 and 
subsequent relevant resolutions, including 
allegations	 of 	 fraud	 and	 corruption,	Affirming	
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over 60 permanent staff  members and its 
estimated functioning cost in furtherance of  
all the investigation reaches $30,000,000!20
The	Committee	concluded	that	Iraq	benefited	
from a scheme whereby a surcharge was 
collected from each oil barrel sold. The sur-
charge was, of  course, illegal. By means of  an 
elaborate scheme, revenue collected from the 
surcharges	would	be	finally	allocated	to	the	
Iraqi	central	bank,	to	Iraqi	officials,	foreign	
officials,	individuals	and	contractors.	Further,	
the Committee concluded that Iraq had most 
prominently	benefitted	from	kickbacks	paid	
by contractors selected to provide humanitar-
ian aid and food. The Committee adds that 
Iraq received around 1.5 billion from those 
kickbacks.21
The scheme to defraud the oil-for-food pro-
gram worked as shown in the charts below. 
Chart 1. Source: Volcker Report22
that	any	illicit	activity	by	United	Nations	officials,	
personnel and agents, as well as contractors, 
including entities that have entered into contracts 
under the Programme, is unacceptable (…)
Affirming	the	letter	of 	its	President	of 	31	March	
2004 welcoming the Secretary-General’s decision 
to create an independent high-level inquiry to 
investigate the administration and management 
of  the Programme and taking note of  the details 
relating to its organization and terms of  reference, 
1. Welcomes the appointment of  the independent 
high-level inquiry (…)”
20 http://www.iic-offp.org/about.htm#6.%20
How%20many%20people%20work%20in%20
the%20IIC 
21 Independent Inquiry Committee into the United 
Nations Oil-For-Food Programme, Report on 
Programme Manipulation, Chapter One, Summary 
of  Report on Programme Manipulation. (Volcker 
Report).
22 Id.
Chart 2. Source: Volcker Report23
I will not elaborate further on the details of  
the fraudulent scheme here. It is explained in 
depth in the Volcker Report.
Against	all	odds,	some	high	UN	officials	and	
businessmen involved in the oil-for food scandal 
were	charged	and/or	tried	by	US	officials	for	
their criminal activity.24 United States’ courts 
were competent to try those cases because 
the defendants had used bank accounts in 
the US to receive revenues of  their activi-
ties. Furthermore, the over broad and highly 
criticized mail fraud statute25	served	as	a	fish	
net to indict the defendants for using (e)mails 
within US soil in furtherance of  schemes to 
defraud.
Three cases are particularly noteworthy. 
Alexander Yakovlev
Yakovlev,	a	Russian	citizen,	was	the	first	UN	
official	to	be	convicted	for	crimes	related	to	
the oil-for-food scandal. 
After the release of  the conclusions of  
the Volcker report, Kofi Annan waived 
Yakovlev’s immunity and he was tried by a 
US court. According to the Volcker report, 
23 Id.
24 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10741998/ 
May 11, 2010, and http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/16/
AR2007011600706.html May 11, 2010. 
25 Enciso Vanegas, Camilo Alberto. Burn! Chopping 
Down the Inquisitor’s Stake, Arguments against the 
Mail Fraud Statute.
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Yakovlev had tried to bribe Societe Generale 
de Surveillance S.A., in connection with an 
oil inspection contract under the oil-for-food 
program.26
The Committee also came across evidence 
proving that he had received at least $950,000 
in kickbacks from corporations that had been 
selected as contractors in transactions adding 
up to $79,000,000.27 Yakovlev was accused 
of  wire fraud and money laundering for ac-
cepting approximately $1,000,000 in bribes 
from UN contractors. He pleaded guilty in 
2005.28
Benon V. Sevan
As of  January 16, 2007, Benon V. Sevan, 
Chipriot national, was indicted by a Manhattan 
prosecutor for taking $160,000 in bribes, 
abusing of  his position as head of  the oil-for-
food program.29 Mr. Sevan intended to block 
efforts to review and investigate corruption 
accusations under the program. He allegedly 
instructed his staff  that complaints about 
illegal	 payoffs	 should	 be	 filed	 before	 the	
whistleblower’s country.30
However, Mr. Sevan was never tried in court. 
He	fled	to	his	native	Cyprus,	and	never	faced	
the charges raised against him by a US pros-
ecutor.31 Obvious reasons make apparent that 
he will not stand trial in the future for his con-
duct in the oil-for-food program. Of  course, 
Mr. Sevan’s has a right to a presumption of  
innocence, and I do not make any claim on his 
innocence or guilt. Yet it seems plainly wrong 
that Mr. Sevan can turn away and ignore the 
serious	accusations	against	him,	by	flying	back	
home. Likewise, it doesn’t seem probable that 
26 http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,165164,00.
html 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/01/16/AR2007011600706.
html May 11, 2010. 
30 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/
article583823.ece May 11, 2010. 
31 h t t p : / / w w w. h e r i t a g e . o r g / R e s e a r c h /
Reports/2009/02/Oil-for-Food-Revisited-The-
UN-Should-Not-Pay-Benon-Sevans-Legal-Fees 
a Chipriot court will prosecute Mr. Sevan for 
his role in the oil-for-food program. 
The story does not end here, however. I will 
come back to Mr. Sevan in Section 4 below.
Tongsun Park
South Korean businessman Tongsu Park was 
arrested in Houston, United States, in 2006. 
He had been indicted for receiving bribes 
from Iraq in the oil-for-food program. In July 
he was convicted on conspiracy charges. He 
was	the	first	person	convicted	in	relation	to	
the oil-for-food scandal.32
Mr. Park admitted taking more than $2,500,000 
from Iraq government to bribe senior UN of-
ficials.	His	objective	was	to	persuade	them	to	
ease economic sanctions against Iraq after the 
Gulf  War.33 His trial also unveiled a network 
of  businessmen and politicians that aimed to 
ease UN sanction against Iraq after Kuwait’s 
invasion, in 1990. The efforts of  that group 
apparently led to the oil-for-food program. 
Mr. Park “funneled hundreds of  thousands 
in cash from the South Korean government 
to	 influential	members	 of 	Congress.	After	
the	 case	 broke,	 Park	fled	 to	 South	Korea.	
But after bribery charges against him were 
dropped, he agreed to return to the United 
States and testify before Congress about his 
activities.”34
Mr. Park’s conviction is just one of  the many 
cases of  corruption involving corporate 
managers.35 However, the scope of  this paper 
32 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/02/22/AR2007022201650.
html?sub=AR 
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Regardless of  its accuracy, Wikipedia summarizes 
some of  the major corruption cases of  corporate 
managers in relation to the oil-for-food program, 
as follows: “On April 1, 2010, Daimler AG plead 
guilty to bribery charges brought by the US Justice 
Department and the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission and will pay $185 million (US) as 
settlement, but remains subject to a two-year 
deferred prosecution agreement and oversight by 
an independent monitor. The German automaker 
of  Mercedes-Benz vehicles was accused of  
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does not reach criminal liability of  contrac-
tors or outsiders. That topic could be matter 
of  a later essay. Mr. Park’s case, however, is 
relevant to show some of  the problems aris-
ing	from	corruption	of 	UN	officials	and	the	
extent of  corruption within the UN. 
After reviewing the cases mentioned above, it 
is relevant to ask what would have happened 
had US prosecutors and courts not exercised 
their jurisdiction against the defendants. 
Furthermore, what would have happened if  
no territoriality nexus with a country with a 
strong judicial system had been present in 
those cases? Moreover, what would have hap-
pened	if 	the	individuals	charged	had	fled	the	
country	filing	the	indictment,	as	it	occurred	
in Mr. Sevan’s case? I believe that the most 
reasonable guess is to say that nothing would 
have happened. The persons charged would 
be out of  the reach of  justice.
One last issue is worth mentioning. The cor-
ruption	 in	Iraq	 influenced	also	 the	 internal	
violating the terms of  the United Nations’ Oil for 
Food Program with Iraq by including kickbacks 
10 percent of  the contract values to the Iraqi 
government. The SEC said the company earned 
more than $4 million from the sale of  vehicles 
and spare parts. The SEC case was sparked in 
2004 after David Bazzetta, a former auditor at 
then	DaimlerChrysler	Corp,	filed	a	whistle-blower	
complaint	after	he	was	fired	for	raising	questions	
about bank accounts controlled by Mercedes-Benz 
units in South America. Bazzetta alleged that he 
learned in a July 2001 corporate audit executive 
committee meeting in Stuttgart that business units 
“continued to maintain secret bank accounts to 
bribe	 foreign	 government	 officials,”	 though	 the	
company knew the practice violated U.S. laws. The 
investigation for the case also revealed that Daimler 
made some $56 million in bribes related to more 
than 200 transactions in 22 countries that earned 
the company $1.9 billion in revenue and at least 
$91.4	million	 in	 illegal	 profits.	 “Using	 offshore	
bank accounts, third-party agents and deceptive 
pricing practices, these companies [Daimler AG 
and its subsidiaries] saw foreign bribery as a way 
of  doing business,” said Mythili Raman, a principal 
deputy in the Justice Department’s criminal division. 
“It is no exaggeration to describe corruption and 
bribe-paying at Daimler as a standard business 
practice,” Robert Khuzami, director of  the SEC’s 
enforcement division, said in a statement. Judge 
Richard J. Leon of  United States District Court 
in Washington, approved the plea agreement and 
settlement, calling it a “just resolution.” 
affairs of  the country, and in a certain way 
legitimized what has been a common practice 
for centuries, but aggravating it, namely cor-
ruption. The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister 
Barham Salih stated: 
“Uncontrolled levels of  corruption in Iraq 
are	fuelling	the	country’s	sectarian	conflict	
and creating a political economy of  violence. 
The	political	 economy	of 	 this	 conflict	 is	
very much rooted in the alarming levels of  
corruption we are dealing with. A lot of  the 
money from many sectors of  the economy 
is diverted to sustain the violence.”36
Unfortunately, the lack of  legitimacy of  
the UN after the oil-for-food program makes 
it	very	difficult	for	the	UN	to	advocate	for	
transparency in that context, without looking 
hypocritical. 
1.3 Additional Funds, New 
Responsibilities, Greater Risks
The foregoing cases of  corruption by UN of-
ficials	are	probably	only	the	tip	of 	the	iceberg	
of  a major and increasing problem. The gen-
eral impunity surrounding those cases, as well 
as many others, is a huge incentive to engage 
in additional illegal activities, in a world where 
UN action is increasingly necessary. 
For example, in between 1945 and 1990, 
despite	myriad	of 	conflicts	that	evidently	put	
at risk international peace and security, the 
UN only established 18 peace operations.37 
In contrast, after the end of  the cold war, 
the UN was resumed a broad range of  ac-
tivities. In the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
document, the General Assembly stated 
that	the	mobilization	of 	financial	resources	
for development of  poor countries or with 
economies in transition was central to a global 
partnership for development, in furtherance 
of  the Millennium Development Goals.38 In 
the same document, the GA assured:
36 Cited by Looney, Robert E., Reconstruction and 
Peacebuilding Under Extreme Adversity: The 
Problem of  Pervasive Corruption in Iraq. P. 1. 
37 Schaeffer, Brett. Supra, 2.
38 A/60/L.1. September 15, 2005. 2005 World Summit 
Outcome. P.5-6.
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“a) We are encouraged by recent com-
mitments to substantial increases in 
official development assistance and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development estimate that official 
development assistance to all developing 
countries will now increase by around $50 
billion a year by 2010, while recognizing 
that a substantial increase in such assistance 
is required to achieve the internationally 
agreed goals, including the Millennium 
Development Goals, within their respective 
time frames; b) We welcome the increased 
resources that will become available as a 
result of  the establishment of  timetables by 
many developed countries to achieve the tar-
get of  0.7 per cent of  gross national product 
for	official	development	assistance	by	2015	
and to reach at least 0.5 per cent of  gross 
national	 product	 for	official	 development	
assistance by 2010 as well as, pursuant to the 
Brussels Programme of  Action for the least 
developed countries, 0.15 per cent to 0.20 
per cent for the least developed countries by 
no later than 2010, and urge those developed 
countries that have not yet done so to make 
concrete efforts in this regard in accordance 
with their commitments; (…) h) We resolve 
to operationalize the World Solidarity Fund 
established by the General Assembly and 
invite those countries in a position to do 
so to make voluntary contributions to the 
fund;”39 (emphasis added)
In addition, the document states:
“103. We request the Secretary-General to 
establish a multi-year standing Peacebuilding 
Fund	for	post-conflict	peacebuilding,	fun-
ded by voluntary contributions and taking 
due account of  existing instruments. The 
objectives of  the Peacebuilding Fund will 
include ensuring the immediate release of  
resources needed to launch peacebuilding 
activities and the availability of  appropriate 
financing	for	recovery.”40
Whereas that huge amount of  resources 
provides	 a	magnificent	 opportunity	 to	 aid	
countries in extreme situations of  violence, 
poverty, transitional justice proceedings, or 
analogous situations, it is also provides global 
cronies with a major opportunity to make 
business and defraud funds and projects des-
39 Id.
40 Id. at 26.
tined	to	benefit	those	societies	and	individuals	
at risk. A strong message of  zero-tolerance 
against	UN	officials	engaged	 in	corruption	
schemes should be sent as soon as possible.
According to Brett Schaeffer by the end 
of  June 2009 the UN DPKO was directing 
and providing support to sixteen peace-
keeping operations and two peace building 
operations.41 The size of  those operations is 
breathtaking. By 2009 they involved approxi-
mately 93,000 uniformed personnel from 118 
countries, more than 20,000 volunteers, and 
more that “2,000 military observers, police, 
international and local civilians, and UN 
volunteers are involved in the two political 
or peace building missions.”42 Moreover, 
according to Schaeffer the budget of  the 
DPKO from July, 2009 to June, 2010, was 
of  $7.75 billion!
Summarizing, the responsibilities and re-
sources of  the UN have grown from 
monitoring	 cease-fires,	 demilitarized	 zones	
and	 post-conflict	 security,	 to	much	more	
complex peace operations such as “complex 
military interventions, civilian police duties, 
human rights interventions, reconstruc-
tion,	overseeing	elections,	and	post-conflict	
reconstruction.”43
Those interventions create the appropriate 
ground where a corrupt bureaucracy can 
flourish44, and provide almost unlimited funds 
that make the dreams of  any crony come true, 
unless determined action is taken.
2. Victims and the Global Public 
Sphere 
2.1 General Remarks
Mark Philip has described public corruption 
as a triadic relation. Three main actors are 
41 Schaeffer, Brett. Supra, 3.
42 Id. at 3. 
43 Schaeffer, Brett. Supra, 2.
44 Id. at 4. According to Schaeffer: “This stress [of  
current level of  UN activity] has contributed to 
serious problems of  mismanagement, misconduct, 
poor planning, corruption, sexual abuse by 
U.N. personnel, unclear mandates, and other 
weaknesses.”
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involved	 in	 the	 unlawful	 activity.	The	first	
party	is	the	occupant	of 	the	public	office;	the	
second	party	is	the	intended	(lawful)	benefi-
ciary	of 	that	office;	and	the	third	party	is	the	
actual	beneficiary	of 	the	particular	exercise	
of 	that	office.45
In	the	context	we	are	analyzing	the	first	party	
would	be	the	UN	official	abusing	of 	its	office;	
the second party would be the contractor, 
state	agent,	or	any	other	third	party	benefiting	
from	an	unlawful	behavior	of 	the	UN	official;	
and the third party, the victim, would have 
a triple nature. Firstly, global citizens that 
trust in the work and transparency of  the 
UN, and that rely on its effective work as an 
effective mechanism to preserve international 
peace and stability. Secondly, the immediate 
citizens of  the host country or countries 
supposed	 to	 benefit	 from	 the	 role	 of 	 the	
corrupt	 official.	Thirdly,	member	 states	 of 	
the UN that contribute to the UN system, 
relying	on	 the	 transparency	of 	 its	officials,	
are also deceived. 
2.2 Citizens of  the host state
The citizens of  the host state are stakeholders 
of  UN activity. In many occasion UN inter-
ventions need to be done without express 
authorization of  the host state. Moreover, it 
is not possible to ask the citizens of  the host 
state if  they do agree with the intervention. In 
occasions there is no time for that. Imminent 
risks need to be addressed quickly in order 
to prevent humanitarian catastrophes. This is 
more likely in an era in which the notion of  
responsibility to protect has gained impor-
tance in the international community.46 
Citizens of  the intervened countries have a 
right	to	benefit	from	the	funds	and	projects	
allocated	 and	 designed	 from	 their	 benefit.	
Corruption	 of 	UN	officials	 obstructs	 the	
exercise of  that right, and in many occasions 
even worsens the actual situation of  the 
persons that UN activity is supposed to help. 
45 Philip, Mark (2008) ‘Peacebuilding and Corruption’, 
International Peacekeeping, 15: 3, 310 – 327, 315.
46 Outcome Document of  the 2005 UN summit. 
http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.
html 
For example, in the Iraq case studied above, 
one of  the non intended consequences of  
UN intervention has been massive and futile 
expenditure in infrastructure. That infrastruc-
ture has become an easy target for rebels and 
a	financial	 drain	 for	 the	United	 States,	 the	
UN and the Iraqi government.47 As a con-
sequence,	rebel	groups	have	benefited	from	
stealing oil and other hydrocarbon from the 
weak infrastructure, thus literally fueling their 
illegal activities. Finally, and more importantly, 
Iraqi citizens have suffered detriment as the 
resources from the oil within their territory 
has	been	used	to	fill	the	pockets	of 	corrupt	
officials	and	not	to	invest	in	projects	aimed	
at	benefiting	the	life	quality	of 	Iraqis.	
The corruption of  UN officials has also 
paved the road for a pervasive, structural, and 
extended corruption in Iraq. That situation 
fosters criminal networks that may become 
important actors in the struggle for power, 
and that, of  course, may affect in a negative 
way the rule of  law, international relations, 
and regional stability.48 The right to peace of  
individuals of  Iraq is therefore endangered. 
This is likely to occur also in other settings 
in which UN corruption tacitly or explicitly 
endorses corruption.
2.3 Global demos
Complex theoretical and philosophical 
debates are currently in vogue with regard 
to the existence and nature of  a global demos. 
I will not elaborate on this particular issue 
here. I assume that that global demos exists, and 
that it has rights and duties, which it owes 
to individuals and communities around the 
globe, and even to individuals that haven’t yet 
been born, i.e. ecological duties. That global 
demos interacts in a global public sphere with 
sovereign states, international organization 
and even NGOs. 
47 Looney,  Rober t  E. ,  Reconstr uct ion and 
Peacebuilding Under Extreme Adversity: The 
Problem of  Pervasive Corruption in Iraq. P. 1. 
48 Holt, Victoria K. and Boucher, Alix J. (2009) 
‘Framing the Issue: UN Responses to Corruption 
and	Criminal	Networks	in	Post-Conflict	Settings’,	
International Peacekeeping, 16: 1, 20 -32. 
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I believe, however, that the global demos has 
two	different	facets.	The	first	is	the	politically	
organized group of  nation-states, and the 
second is the demos composed by citizens 
of  those states, understood as universal mul-
titude.49 That multitude does not respond to a 
centralized source of  power nor to any gov-
ernment or power structure. That multitude 
is composed by global citizens. The global 
demos as a key player of  the international 
arena will become increasingly important in 
the years to come, if  proposals by scholars 
and politicians such as the creation of  a global 
parliament move forward.50
I	believe	that	corruption	of 	UN	official	jeop-
ardizes the goal of  preserving international 
peace and security, and consequently harms 
the rights and interests of  the global demos. As 
the UN is an almost entirely universal organ, 
guided by common values accepted by its 
member states (who act as agents of  their 
own nationals), grave harm to such values by 
UN	officials	must	be	punished.	One	form	of 	
grave harm to the UN values is corruption. 
The delegation and participation models of  
authority51 become relevant when analyzing 
UN power and accountability issues. Whereas 
some believe that the UN reports to its mem-
ber states under a delegation model, I believe, 
that the UN and its officials are directly 
accountable to the people affected by their 
actions, under the participation model. 
As not only the immediate victims of  cor-
ruption cases are affected by them, but also 
the global public sphere composed by global 
citizens is harmed, I believe that the UN as 
visible organ of  the global demos should hold 
corrupt	officials	under	 its	own	jurisdiction,	
49 Virno, Paolo. A Grammar of  the Multitude. For an 
Analysis of  Contemporary Forms of  Life. 2004. 
Virno, Paolo. Multitude: Between Innovation and 
Negation. 2008.
50 Falk, Richard and Strauss, Andrew. ‘On the Creation 
of  a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the 
Power of  Popular Sovereignty’, Stanford Journal of  
International Law, Volume 36, Number 2, 3-31. 
51 Aoi, Chiyuki et Al. Unintended Consequences of  
Peacekeeping. Centre for International Political 
Studies. University of  Pretoria. P. 13.
imposing on them appropriate criminal 
sanctions. 
The global demos is thus also a stakeholder of  
UN activity, and its rights should be protected 
with the strongest tool that the rule of  law 
has at its disposal: criminal law.52
2.4 Member States of  the UN
Member States are the third type of  victim of  
corruption	by	UN	officials.	The	largest	part	
of  the funds of  the UN comes from member 
states of  the organization. The constituents 
of  the UN, therefore, have a legitimate ex-
pectation that the funds allocated by them 
to the UN will be used lawfully and for the 
purposes for which the funds were disbursed. 
One could expect, therefore, that member 
states would be the most interested parties in 
creating an international system of  criminal 
accountability	for	UN	officials.	
However, this is not necessarily true. 
Paradoxically, the member states that contrib-
ute with more resources to the functioning 
of  the UN are at the same time states with a 
strong proclivity toward judicial exceptional-
ism. The United States, for example, have 
repeatedly rejected the possibility of  having 
US citizens tried by foreign or international 
courts.53 Therefore, it seems apparent that 
several obstacles must be overcome in order 
to have the United States support a new 
system of  criminal accountability for UN 
officials.	This	is	particularly	true,	when	those	
officials	are	US	citizens	or	residents.
The problem of  this is that when US citizens 
or residents get involved in corruption cases, 
the likeliness of  a successful prosecution and 
adjudication of  the case at hand relies almost 
entirely in the discretion of  the United States 
President and his Attorney General. In sensi-
tive cases for political actors, contractors or 
donor of  political campaigns, political inter-
52 Megret, Frederic. ‘The vicarious responsibility of  
the United Nations’, pp. 250-267, in Aoi, de Coning 
& Thakur, footnote 2. 
53 Goldsmith, Jack.  The Terror Presidency: Law And 
Judgment Inside The Bush Administration, New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. Chapter 1.
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est may lead to a deadlock where nobody is 
investigated for the unlawful activities. 
The important thing is that nation-states 
have a legitimate expectation that their con-
tribution, and the contribution of  all other 
states to the UN will be used for legitimate 
purposes, with transparency and strong ac-
countability mechanisms. 
3. Consequences of Preserving the 
Status Quo
3.1 General Remarks
The preservation of  the Status Quo regard-
ing criminal conducts by UN officials is 
unacceptable. That Status Quo may be better 
characterized as a situation that preserves a 
vacuum of  power that is abused by corrupt 
agents	in	their	own	benefit	and	at	the	expense	
of  the global demos, citizens of  host states, 
and the international community. 
Vacuum of  power generally leads to corrup-
tion, violence and anarchy. Recalling Plato’s 
Ring of  Gyges tale, introduced to the reader 
in the voice of  Glaucon in The Republic, in 
an overwhelming number of  cases individuals 
will engage in criminal conducts unless they 
are constrained by the fear of  punishment, 
or unless their ethical standards stand par-
ticularly high.54 
Vacuums of  power are very likely to be pres-
ent in cases where the UN is deemed to act, 
pursuant to peacekeeping/peacebuilding/
responsibility to protect interventions, in 
connection with humanitarian catastrophes. 
As a consequence of  the vacuum of  power, 
a permissive environment for all types of  
violence and criminality arises. This is par-
54 Plato. The Republic. Chapter 2. “For all men believe 
in	their	hearts	that	injustice	is	far	more	profitable	to	
the individual than justice, and he who argues as I 
have been supposing, will say that they are right. If  
you could imagine any one obtaining this power of  
becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or 
touching what was another’s, he would be thought 
by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, 
although they would praise him to one another’s 
faces, and keep up appearances with one another 
from a fear that they too might suffer injustice.”
ticularly	 true	 for	 post-conflict	 conditions,	
where the breakdown of  social and cultural 
norms, law and order, and socio-economic 
infrastructure55, have been severely eroded, 
thus allowing international and domestic 
corruption.
The UN General Assembly has repeatedly 
manifested its concern on the issue of  do-
mestic and international corruption. Pursuant 
to the defeat of  that cancer, the UN enacted 
the UN Convention Against Corruption, 
UNCAC,	which	might	be	considered	the	first	
anticorruption convention. It aims to pro-
mote reforms within states directed to pre-
vent corruption, criminalize and enforce legal 
norms and decision against persons engaged 
in criminal conduct, promotes international 
cooperation	in	the	fight	against	corruption,	
and fosters measures aimed at assuring assets 
recovery.56 UNCAC, however, does not solve 
in any the jurisdictional problems addressed 
in	 this	 paper	 (corruption	by	UN	officials).	
It only intends to solve problems related to 
the transnational asset recovery provision, 
which was a ground breaking develop-
ment	in	the	fight	against	private	and	public	
corruption.57
Other	interesting	efforts	in	the	fight	against	
corruption have been made through the 
enactment of  the OECD Antibribery 
Convention,58 which makes it a crime to 
offer, promise or give a bribe to a foreign 
public	official	in	order	to	obtain	or	retain	an	
international business deal59, and the creation 
of  the Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering, whose purpose is to develop 
and promote national and international poli-
cies	to	fight	money	laundering	and	terrorist	
organizations	financing.60
55 Aoi, Chiyuki et Al. Supra, 2.
56 Bhargava, Vinay. Supra, 356.
57 Bhargava, Vinay. Supra, 357.
58 The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery 
of  Foreign Public Official in International 
Transactions. 
59 In the United States, the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act complies a similar purpose.
60 Bhargava, Vinay. Supra, 357.
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In any case, the preservation of  the Status 
Quo proves to be an undesirable state of  
things for preventing corruption by UN of-
ficials.	The	Status	Quo	fosters	(a)	impunity,	
(b) endangers international peace and ag-
gravates non intended consequences of  UN 
interventions in host states, and (c) fosters 
additional corruption.
3.2 Impunity
Presently, there are only two types of  re-
sponses	against	corrupt	activities	by	UN	offi-
cials: First, the imposition of  disciplinary and 
administrative sanctions against the involved 
party; second, the waiver of  UN immunity 
and the prosecution and adjudication by a 
domestic	court	against	the	official.	None	of 	
these alternatives seems to be convenient. 
On the contrary, I believe that both leaven 
an open leeway for corruption, as it will be 
explained in a subsection below. 
3.2.1 Insufficiency of  disciplinary/
administrative sanctions
It is often contended that the only possible 
and	desirable	 sanction	against	UN	officials	
for corruption cases is the imposition of  
disciplinary and/or administrative sanctions. 
I contend here that if  those sanctions are 
effectively imposed, the overall reputation 
and public image of  the person involved 
is harmed, and in some cases a part of  the 
misguided or misappropriated assets of  the 
UN are recovered, but further than that 
nothing really happens. Those sanctions are 
effective from a disciplinary standpoint, but 
completely ineffective to deter and punish the 
wrongdoing.	The	harm	done	by	the	official	
remains unpunished, the credibility of  the 
UN is destroyed, and impunity triumphs. 
The Kantian call for justice is thus ignored, 
and harm to other individuals and the society 
as a whole takes place and remains without 
sanction. 
“The penal law is a categorical imperative; 
and woe to him who creeps through the 
serpent-windings of  utilitarianism to dis-
cover some advantage that may discharge 
him from the justice of  punishment, or even 
from the due measure of  it, according to the 
Pharisaic maxim: “It is better that one man 
should die that the whold people should 
perish”. For if  justice and righteousness 
perish, human life would no longer have 
any value in the world.”61
In addition, disciplinary and administrative 
proceedings	 can	 easily	 fireback	 against	 the	
UN. Above I said that I would retake below 
the case of  Mr. Sevan. Now is the time. 
According to the Heritage Foundation, 
Sevan’s lawyers are seeking $880,300 plus 
interest from the United Nations for legal 
fees incurred by Mr. Sevan in furtherance of  
his	defense	for	his	activities	as	UN	official	in	
the oil-for-food program.62 Recently, the United 
Nations Administrative Tribunal63 ordered 
the United Nations to pay “all reasonable 
legal fees” to Benon Sevan for issues relates 
to the disciplinary he faced before the UN.
The	UN	 confirmed	 that	 the	 organization	
would abide by the tribunal’s decision. It’s 
a huge contradiction that while Mr. Sevan 
is facing criminal charges before a US court 
for	his	activity	as	a	UN	official,	at	the	same	
time he is awarded by the UN highest ad-
ministrative tribunal with a sum aimed to 
indemnify him for damages pursuant to his 
legal expenses.64
61 Kant, Immanuel. The Philosophy of  Law. W. Hastie 
tr. 1887. Cited by Kadish, Sanford H. et al. Criminal 
Law and Its Processes, Cases and Materials. Eight 
Edition. P. 80.
62 h t t p : / / w w w. h e r i t a g e . o r g / R e s e a r c h /
Reports/2009/02/Oil-for-Food-Revisited-The-
UN-Should-Not-Pay-Benon-Sevans-Legal-Fees
63 The Administrative Tribunal, composed by seven 
members, was created by the General Assembly 
in 1950 to deal with employment related disputed 
between UN staff  and the organization.
64 h t t p : / / w w w. h e r i t a g e . o r g / R e s e a r c h /
Reports/2009/02/Oil-for-Food-Revisited-The-
UN-Should-Not-Pay-Benon-Sevans-Legal-Fees 
The indignation of  right wing scholars for the 
decision of  the UN administrative tribunal was 
expressed as follows: “The U.N.’s decision to pay 
Sevan his legal costs is an affront to American 
taxpayers, who currently give over $5 billion a year 
to the United Nations and deserve accountability 
and respect for the rule of  law. For the United 
Nations to even consider paying what could amount 
to nearly $1 million in legal fees is a disgrace and 
is yet another stain on the reputation of  the world 
body.”
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3.2.2 Domestic investigation and 
adjudication 
Different corruption schemes and scenarios 
are possible at the international level. Let us 
take a look, as an example, to one of  them: 
UN corruption in states with harsh humani-
tarian crises. In those states, the vacuum of  
power and low level of  respect for the rule of  
law in the host countries of  the intervention 
makes it almost impossible to reasonably 
believe that domestic courts will have the 
capacity, autonomy and interest in prosecut-
ing UN cronies. 
In spite of  decisions of  the General Assembly, 
such as those made in the sixty second and 
sixty third sessions, whereby the GA strongly 
urged states to undertake in their domestic 
criminal laws, cooperative investigations 
against	UN	officials	and	experts-on-mission	
engaged in criminal activity, effective prosecu-
tion is not probable.65
The reasons for that conclusion are, among 
others, (i) lack of  interest of  domestic pros-
ecutors or courts to investigate and adjudicate 
cases against the persons involved66, (ii) lack 
of  prosecutorial capacity to collect evidence 
against wrongdoers, (iii) lack of  awareness 
and knowledge to identify and uncover 
complex schemes to defraud and perform in-
ternational corruption, (iv) high vulnerability 
of  domestic courts to bribes and kickbacks in 
furtherance of  trials pursued in local courts, 
(v) political implications of  prosecuting 
nationals from other countries, that might be 
seen as putting at risk the national interest of  
the	host	country,	(vi)	difficulties	deriving	from	
diplomatic immunity and lack of  extradition 
treaties between countries.67
65 A/64/100.
66 See Furham, Johannes. Legal problems concerning 
the lack of  accountability of  UN peacekeeping 
forces. Raizes Juridicas. Curitiba, v.2, n.2 jul./dez. 
2006. P. 29-42. P. 32 (signaling similar problems 
for UN peacekeepers involved in cases of  sexual 
abuse)
67 Furham, Johannes. Supra, 33. Similar problems arise 
in connection with immunity granted in Status of  
Forces Agreements (SOFAs) for personnel working 
in peacekeeping operations, involved with sexual 
abuse crimes.
All this factors contribute to impede the 
prosecution and adjudication of  criminal 
charges	of 	corruption	against	UN	officials,	
and leaves the door open for additional 
criminal conduct.
An	additional	 difficulty	 that	must	be	men-
tioned in this context, is the lack of  legitimacy 
deriving from unequal sentencing practices 
of  different member states. While US courts 
could sentence individuals to several decades 
of  imprisonment, it is highly probable that 
courts of  several other countries could sen-
tence individuals for exactly the same conduct 
to only a year or little more than that; not to 
mention the option that they would have to 
apply to parole or other type of  privileges. 
That does not seem fair from any perspec-
tive.	 In	 that	 scenario,	UN	officials	 accused	
of  mismanagement or corruption could go 
forum shopping, looking for the jurisdiction 
with the most lenient punishment for the 
crimes committed. That practice must not 
be tolerated.
3.2.3 Danger to international peace and 
security and aggravation of  non-
intended consequences
The intervention of  the UN in countries 
in	 conflict	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 non	 intended	
consequences.	As	 countries	 in	 conflict	 are	
highly complex systems, it is logical to expect 
responses to interventions in “a nonlinear 
fashion.”68 
One of  the non intended consequences is 
the exacerbation of  corruption, bolstered by 
the	financial	aid	provided	by	the	UN.69 The 
UN can, indirectly and unconsciously end up 
financing	local	corrupt	lords,	and	persons	and	
organizations engaged with organized crime, 
if  it doesn’t count with strong management 
controls over the disbursement and use of  the 
funds	provided,	and	even	worse,	if 	its	officials	
engage in criminal conduct with others aimed 
at defrauding UN aid. 
Moreover, when corruption is used as a 
means to prevent violent disintegration, and 
68 Aoi, Chiyuki et Al. Supra, 2.
69 Aoi, Chiyuki et Al. Supra, 2.
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counts with additional resources disbursed by 
the UN, in the context of  peacebuilding or 
peacekeeping operations, the whole reform 
agenda is severely undermined, and it may 
even become the “crutch” on which corrupt 
leaders rely to stay on power in an anarchic 
environment.70 This situation aggravates if  we 
take into consideration the fact that corrupt 
governments lack political legitimacy, fact 
that can lead to violence by people frustrated 
by	the	“venality	of 	public	officials”71 or by 
organized crime oriented to usurp power.
The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
implicitly recognizes the intrinsic relation be-
tween transnational crime and corruption:
“111. We express our grave concern at the 
negative effects on development, peace 
and security and human rights posed by 
transnational crime, including the smuggling 
of 	 and	 trafficking	 in	 human	 beings,	 the	
world narcotic drug problem and the illicit 
trade in small arms and light weapons, and 
at the increasing vulnerability of  States to 
such	crime.	We	reaffirm	the	need	to	work	
collectively to combat transnational crime. 
112.	We	recognize	that	trafficking	in	persons	
continues to pose a serious challenge to 
humanity and requires a concerted interna-
tional response. (…)
113. We urge States that have not yet done 
so to consider becoming parties to the rele-
vant international conventions on organized 
crime and corruption and, following their 
entry into force, for them to implement 
them effectively, including by incorporating 
provision of  those conventions into natio-
nal legislation and by strengthening criminal 
justice systems.”72
All the above has, therefore, a close relation 
not just with problems of  lack of  social and 
economic progress, but particularly, with the 
creation and preservation of  conditions likely 
to undermine key social institutions and po-
litical stability.73Unfortunately, the UN system 
70 Rose-Ackerman, Susan (2008) ‘Corruption and 
Government’, International Peacekeeping, 15: 3, 
328-343. 
71 Rose-Ackerman, Susan (2008), Supra, 332.
72 Furhmam. Id. at. 27. 
73 Bhargava, Vinay. Id. at 346.
lacks teeth to impose criminal accountability 
over	officials	involved	with	corruption	scan-
dals, even in the worst cases.
4.2.4 Fostering of  additional corrupt 
practices and harm to the 
legitimacy of  the UN
Preserving the status quo and tolerating impu-
nity will only serve as an incentive to corrupt 
officials	to	further	engage	in	criminal	activity.	
It is a fact that corruption and impunity call 
for more corruption. 
Furthermore, the lack of  criminal account-
ability	 of 	UN	officials	 negatively	 impacts	
UN legitimacy.74 Just as corruption scandals 
in sovereign states parliaments undermine 
democracy and legitimacy of  the state, en-
dangering in many occasions the existence of  
the state itself, at the global level, corruption 
of 	UN	officials	 undermines	 its	 every	 day	
expanding role as a new world Leviathan. 
For those who believe that the UN represents 
the promise of  a new world government, 
legitimacy should be nursed as the most valu-
able living creature. The UN has repeatedly 
insisted in its goal of  fostering democracy not 
only within states, but also at the international 
level.75
It would therefore be certainly incoherent 
to say that the goal of  achieving democratic 
governance does not apply to the organiza-
tion itself, but only to its member states. 
Therefore, a new type of  criminal account-
ability	is	required	against	UN	officials.	Below	
I further elaborate on this issue and draw 
some initial thoughts on how the construc-
74 See Schaeffer, Brett. Supra, 2. (in the same line of  
thought,	 but	 specifically	 directed	 to	 the	need	of 	
reform to prevent abuse of  peacekeepers in UN 
operations).
75 See Pettit, Philip. Two-dimensional Democracy, 
National and International. IILJ Working Paper 
2005/8 (History and Theory of  International Law 
Series, www.iilj.org (discussing a consideration 
of  what “democracy should require in the 
international domain: in the context of  international 
organizations and, more generally, cooperation 
among national governments”)
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tion of  that type of  accountability could be 
achieved. 
4. Criminal accountability over 
egregious corruption cases
4.1 General Remarks
In Section 2 I pointed out the growing scope 
of  action of  the UN in current world affairs. 
That growth signals the construction process 
of  a new global Leviathan, namely the United 
Nations. The question we should ask is 
whether	the	UN	and	its	officials	should	have	
unfettered power, or whether the institutional 
design should intend to control the exercise 
of  such power under the limits of  the rule 
of  law. 
The General Assembly stated in the 2005 
World Outcome Summit document:
“15.We pledge to enhance the relevance, 
effectiveness,	efficiency,	accountability	and	
credibility of  the United Nations system. 
This is our shared responsibility and 
interest.76 (…) Recognizing the need for 
universal adherence and implementation 
of  the rule of  law at both the national and 
international	levels,	we:	134.	(a)	Reaffirm	our	
commitment to the purposes and principles 
of  the Charter and international law and to 
an international order based on the rule of  
law and international law, which is essential 
for peaceful coexistence and cooperation 
among States;”77
It seems very clear that the General Assembly 
has recently renewed its vows, in the same line 
of  the original Charter of  the UN, pursuant 
to the promotion of  the rule of  law and 
democracy. 
“11. We acknowledge that good gover-
nance and the rule of  law at the national 
and international levels are essential for 
sustained economic growth, sustainable 
development and the eradication of  poverty 
and hunger.”78
76 Id.
77 Id. at. 30.
78 A/60/L.1. September 15, 2005. World Summit 
Outcome. P.2.
It is my contention that criminal account-
ability	of 	UN	officials	is	a	necessary	means	
to enhance the rule of  law and the checks and 
balances system of  the UN. Only through 
criminal	 accountability,	UN	officials	would	
have a real deterrent to engage in criminal 
conduct, by the fear of  investigation and 
severe criminal punishment. At the same time, 
punishment would reinforce the validity of  
the UN legal framework.79
4.2 UN Jurisdiction over its own 
officials
The UN should ensure the creation of  
criminal accountability that would enable 
the organization to prosecute and adjudicate 
cases of  white collar crime. The UN should 
assume competence over the most egregious 
crimes	 of 	 its	 own	 officials,	 by	 promoting	
the adjudication of  jurisdiction to the ICC 
of  crimes such as those contemplated in 
the document of  the UN Action Against 
Corruption in Bribery. 
In that document, the most serious cor-
ruption-related offenses are deemed to be: 
bribery, fraud, speed money payments, illicit 
political contributions, abuse of  power, color 
of 	office	and/or	breach	of 	trust,	misappro-
priation	of 	public	funds,	and	conflict	of 	inter-
est80; to which I would add illicit enrichment, 
money laundering, and insider trading.81 
79 A	 clarification	must	 be	made	 at	 this	 point.	
Criminologist and criminal lawyers have 
discussed throughout centuries the issue of  
the real deterrent effect of  criminal laws. Some 
assure that criminal laws are useless pursuant 
to such end, and others assert the contrary. 
Pursuant to this article I assume as a given 
that criminal law does work as a deterrent of  
corrupt	 behavior	 of 	UN	officials,	 and	 that,	
moreover, it is necessary not just because 
of  its deterrence effects, but also because 
punishment is a fair and just response to the 
abuse	of 	power	and	of 	color	of 	office.
80 United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Division. United Nations Action against 
Corruption and Bribery. September 1997. P. 8-11.
81	 This	crime	takes	place	when	a	public	official	cannot	
justify the source of  any income or asset within its 
patrimony. 
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Pursuant to this proposal, the ICC could en-
deavor to prosecute only the most egregious 
corruption cases, based on wide prosecutorial 
discretion.	Rationales	to	define	when	a	case	
is egregious could be the amount of  money 
involved in the transactions, the scope of  the 
damage of  the unlawful activity, the number 
of  persons involved in the conspiracy to 
commit the crime, and/or the ranking of  the 
officials	involved.
4.3 Complicity
The competent prosecutor should have 
the right to indict the alleged wrongdoers 
as principals or aiders and abettors of  the 
criminal activities. Further, it would be pos-
sible to adopt the United States Model Penal 
Code, that finds that aiders and abettors 
are equally liable for the crimes committed 
by the principal as their own. However, the 
distinction between the two categories of  
participants would be useful pursuant to 
sentencing issues. 
4.4 Required mens rea element of  
specific crimes
The specific crimes for which the ICC 
should assume jurisdiction should obvi-
ously	 require	 a	 specific	mental	 state.	 The	
required mens rea element could be present, 
depending on the nature of  each crime, 
when the agent commits the actus reus with 
purpose, intent, recklessness, or negligence. 
Of  course, however, the nature of  the mens 
rea element present on each occasion would 
have an important impact on the sanction 
to be imposed in each case. But this could 
be subject of  a different paper. 
4.5 Punishment
The	 punishment	 system	 for	UN	 officials	
could work in exactly the same way as it does 
for criminals under Section x of  the Rome 
Statute. No reform would be needed in that 
regard. Therefore, the sanction imposed 
would be enforced in a member state that 
previously manifested to the ICC its avail-
ability to receive convicted parties.82
82 Rome Statute. Article 103 and following.
5. Institutional Reform of the 
ICC
5.1 Enhancing competence of  the 
International Criminal Court
The competence of  the ICC could be 
enhanced through article 123 of  the Rome 
Statute. According to such article, after seven 
years of  the entry into force of  the statue, 
the Secretary General of  the UN must invite 
member states to a conference whereby 
amendment proposals to the statute will be 
evaluated. 
According to article 123, the review of  the 
Rome Statute may comprehend the crimes 
listed under article 5, but is not limited to 
them. Therefore, if  the proposal of  central-
izing	criminal	accountability	of 	UN	officials	
obtained widespread approval by member 
states, that kind a accountability could be 
included in the Rome Statute. 
Schaeffer argues against what I hereby pro-
pose. He asserts that:
“The abusers and their governments must 
face real consequences to create incentives 
for effective enforcement. The remedy 
should not involve countries yielding ju-
risdiction over their personnel to the U.N. 
or to a non-national judicial authority, but 
it should entail commitments by member 
states to investigate, try, and punish their 
personnel in cases of  misconduct.”83
Schaeffer contention is naïve. It is simply not 
reasonable to believe that member states will 
comply with the “obligation” to try and con-
vict	UN	officials	within	its	territory.	This	is	
particularly true in countries with non liberal 
governments or high corruption levels. 
I believe, on the contrary, that the ICC could 
play	a	significant	role,	as	I	have	stated,	in	the	
promotion of  the rule of  law, checks and 
balances, and democratic global governance. 
In a certain way, it can do something similar 
to what has been achieved by the ICJ at other 
level:
83 Schaeffer, Brett. Supra, 12.
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“134. (f) Recognize the important role of  
the International Court of  Justice, the prin-
cipal judicial organ of  the United Nations, 
in adjudicating disputes among States and 
the value of  its work, call upon States that 
have not yet done so to consider accepting 
the jurisdiction of  the Court in accordance 
with its Statute and consider mans of  stren-
gthening the Court’s work (…)”84
The role of  the ICC could be facilitated by 
a cooperative relationship with OIOS. The 
highly specialized knowledge that OIOS has 
developed in the process of  auditing UN 
work can prove particularly useful for ICC 
prosecutors and courts. 
“12. Aside from the overall structure of  
the Investigations Division, OIOS has 
also begun to further develop its capacity 
to conduct specialized investigations. The 
primary consideration in this has been the 
distinction between the two main types 
of  cases investigated by OIOS, namely 
sexual	exploitation	and	abuse	and	financial,	
economic and administrative cases, and 
the need to ensure that qualified teams 
investigate these cases effectively. The skills 
and experience required for these types of  
cases	vary	significantly,	and	the	experience	
of  OIOS over the years provides a compe-
lling argument for concentrating specialized 
investigators within three regional centres: 
New York; Vienna; and Nairobi.
13. In addition, the Investigations Division 
focused on ensuring that the competencies 
and knowledge developed by the Procurement 
Task Force were incorporated into the knowl-
edge base of  the Investigations Division. In 
particular, the Division conducted a survey 
of  the Procurement Task Force best practices 
and lessons learned.”85
This is important because it would substan-
tially reduce the cost of  creating a new bu-
reaucracy of  prosecutors and judges deemed 
to adjudicate corruption cases. What could 
be done is to compartmentalize internally 
the	ICC	so	personnel	with	specific	knowl-
edge on international corruption could focus 
84 Id. at. 30.
85 A/64/326(Part I) (24 Aug 2009), P. 9. 
on that type of  cases, whereas personnel 
involved with international humanitarian 
law violations could focus on those more 
traditional kind of  violations to international 
criminal law. 
5.2 Complementary and Subsidiarity
This is a complex issue that would need to 
be addressed in a later work. 
Conclusions
Summarizing, it is apparent that corruption 
of 	UN	officials	 is	one	of 	the	most	serious	
problems faced by the international commu-
nity today. None of  the existing mechanisms 
to	sanction	the	officials	involved	in	wrongdo-
ing of  that kind seems strong or effective 
enough to address the problem and punish 
the parties responsible. 
The victims of  the wrongdoing are citizens 
of  host countries, the global demos, and the 
member states of  the UN system. Those 
parties are deprived of  the honest services 
of 	 the	 corrupt	 officials,	 and	 regional	 and	
international peace and security are put at risk. 
Strong measures should be imposed to deter 
that kind of  wrongdoing and to punish the 
individuals responsible. Criminal liability is 
one of  the most important types of  measures 
that need to be adopted. 
The most convenient thing to do in further-
ance of  the creation of  criminal accountabil-
ity institutions and mechanisms appropriate 
to combat corruption, is to enhance the 
competency of  the ICC. The crimes for 
which the ICC should assume competency 
are the most relevant conducts to which UN 
cronies have resorted in furtherance of  their 
unlawful activities. The punishment imposed 
by a sentence of  the ICC could be enforced 
in state members of  the Rome Statute, as 
provided under Chapter x of  the statute.
Bibliography
Pettit, Philip. Two-dimensional Democracy, 
National and International. IILJ Working 
Paper 2005/8 (History and Theory of  
International Law Series, www.iilj.org
167
C
ol
ab
or
ad
or
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l
On the  
criminality 
accountability  
of 	un	officials
Bhargava, Vinay. Curing the Cancer of  
Corruption. In: Global Issues for Global 
Citizens. Chapter 18, 341-370, 343.
Schaeffer, Brett. Critical Reforms Required 
for U.N. Peacekeeping. September 8, 2009. 
P. 1. http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Reports/2009/Critical-Reforms-Required-
for-UN-Peacekeeping 
Murphy, Ray (2006) ‘An Assessment of  
UN Efforts to Address Sexual Misconduct 
by Peacekeeping Personnel’, International 
Peacekeeping, 13: 531-546, 532.
Enciso Vanegas, Camilo Alberto. Burn! 
Chopping Down the Inquisitor’s Stake, 
Arguments against the Mail Fraud Statute.
Looney, Robert E., Reconstruction and 
Peacebuilding Under Extreme Adversity: 
The Problem of  Pervasive Corruption in 
Iraq. P. 1. 
Philip, Mark (2008) ‘Peacebuilding and 
Corruption’, International Peacekeeping, 15: 
3, 310 – 327, 315.
Outcome Document of  the 2005 UN 
summit.
http://www.un.org/summit2005/docu-
ments.html 
Holt, Victoria K. and Boucher, Alix J. 
(2009) ‘Framing the Issue: UN Responses to 
Corruption and Criminal Networks in Post-
Conflict	Settings’,	International	Peacekeeping,	
16: 1, 20 -32. 
Virno,Paolo. A Grammar of  the Multitude. 
For an Analysis of  Contemporary Forms of  
Life. 2004. Virno, Paolo. Multitude: Between 
Innovation and Negation. 2008.
Falk, Richard and Strauss, Andrew. ‘On the 
Creation of  a Global Peoples Assembly: 
Legitimacy and the Power of  Popular 
Sovereignty’, Stanford Journal of  International 
Law, Volume 36, Number 2, 3-31.
Aoi, Chiyuki et Al. Unintended Consequences 
of  Peacekeeping. Centre for International 
Political Studies. University of  Pretoria. P. 
13.
Megret, Frederic. ‘The vicarious responsibility 
of  the United Nations’, pp. 250-267, in Aoi, 
de Coning & Thakur, footnote 2. 
Goldsmith, Jack.  The Terror Presidency: 
Law And Judgment Inside The Bush 
Administration, New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2007. Chapter 1.
Plato. The Republic. Chapter 2.
Kant, Immanuel. The Philosophy of  Law. W. 
Hastie tr. 1887. Cited by Kadish, Sanford H. 
et al. Criminal Law and Its Processes, Cases 
and Materials. Eight Edition. P. 80.
Furham, Johannes. Legal problems concern-
ing the lack of  accountability of  UN peace-
keeping forces. Raizes Juridicas. Curitiba, v.2, 
n.2 jul./dez. 2006. P. 29-42. P. 32 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (2008) ‘Corruption 
and Government’, International Peacekeeping, 
15: 3, 328-343. 
http ://www.her i tage.org/Research/
Reports/2009/02/Oil-for-Food-Revisited-
The-UN-Should-Not-Pay-Benon-Sevans-
Legal-Fees
h t t p : / / w w w . f o x n e w s . c o m /
story/0,2933,165164,00.html 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
politics/article583823.ece May 11, 2010. 
http ://www.her i tage.org/Research/
Reports/2009/02/Oil-for-Food-Revisited-
The-UN-Should-Not-Pay-Benon-Sevans-
Legal-Fees 
h t tp ://www.wash ing tonpos t . com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/22/
AR2007022201650.html?sub=AR 
http://www.her i tage.org/Research/
Reports/2009/Critical-Reforms-Required-
for-UN-Peacekeeping (in the same line of  
thought,	but	specifically	directed	to	the	need	
of  reform to prevent abuse of  peacekeepers 
in UN operations).
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10741998/ 
May 11, 2010
h t tp ://www.wash ing tonpos t . com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/16/
AR2007011600706.html May 11, 2010. 
http://www.iic-offp.org/about.htm#6.%20
How%20many%20people%20work%20
in%20the%20IIC 
168
C
ol
ab
or
ad
or
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l
Camilo A. Enciso 
Vanegas
h t t p : / / w w w. b r i t a n n i c a . c o m / b p s /
additionalcontent/18/23307545/THE-
AC C U S AT I O N S - AG A I N S T- T H E -
OIL-FOR-FOOD-PROGRAM-THE-
VOLCKER-REPORTS May 11, 2010. 
The OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of  Foreign Public Official in 
International Transactions. 
United Nations Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Division. United Nations 
Action against Corruption and Bribery. 
September 1997. P. 8-11.
Rome Statute (whereby the International 
Criminal Court is created)
A/60/L.1. September 15, 2005. World 
Summit Outcome. P.2.
A/64/326(Part I) (24 Aug 2009), P. 9. http://
www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/annual_re-
ports.html 
A/64/100. 
2009 Global Corruption Barometer, 
Transparency International. 2. www.trans-
parency.org 
OIOS, A/64/326(Part I) (24 Aug 2009)
OIOS, A/64/326(Part I)/Add.1 (26 Aug 
2009) 
OIOS, A/64/326(Part II) (23 Feb 2010)
SC/1538 (2004)
Conclusions of  the meeting of  the G8 
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. Miyazaki, Japan, 
13 July, 2000. 
Independent Inquiry Committee into the 
United Nations Oil-For-Food Programme, 
Report on Programme Manipulation, Chapter 
One, Summary of  Report on Programme 
Manipulation. (Volcker Report).
